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Abstract. Recent years have witnessed increasing interest in the poten-
tial benefits of ‘intelligent’ autonomous machines such as robots. Honda’s
Asimo humanoid robot, iRobot’s Roomba robot vacuum cleaner and
Google’s driverless cars have fired the imagination of the general pub-
lic, and social media buzz with speculation about a utopian world of
helpful robot assistants or the coming robot apocalypse! However, there
is a long way to go before autonomous systems reach the level of ca-
pabilities required for even the simplest of tasks involving human-robot
interaction - especially if it involves communicative behaviour such as
speech and language. Of course the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI)
has made great strides in these areas, and has moved on from abstract
high-level rule-based paradigms to embodied architectures whose opera-
tions are grounded in real physical environments. What is still missing,
however, is an overarching theory of intelligent communicative behaviour
that informs system-level design decisions in order to provide a more
coherent approach to system integration. This chapter introduces the
beginnings of such a framework inspired by the principles of Perceptual
Control Theory (PCT). In particular, it is observed that PCT has hith-
erto tended to view perceptual processes as a relatively straightforward
series of transformations from sensation to perception, and has over-
looked the potential of powerful generative model-based solutions that
have emerged in practical fields such as visual or auditory scene analy-
sis. Starting from first principles, a sequence of arguments is presented
which not only shows how these ideas might be integrated into PCT, but
which also extend PCT towards a remarkably symmetric architecture for
a needs-driven communicative agent. It is concluded that, if behaviour
is the control of perception (the central tenet of PCT), then perception
(at least for communicative agents) is the simulation of behaviour.
Keywords: perceptual control theory, artificial intelligence, cognitive
systems, robotics, communicative agents
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2 R. K. Moore: PCT and Beyond
1 Introduction
The past few decades have seen an enormous growth in the level of interest being
shown in so-called ‘intelligent’ machines [1]. Funding agencies and large corpora-
tions worldwide have been investing heavily in autonomous systems - especially
robotics - on the premise that significant economic benefits may be derived from
automating hitherto people-intensive activities. Ranging from production-line
robots to homecare assistants, and from robotic surgeons to driverless cars, fu-
ture intelligent systems are expected to transform our lives in much the same
way that the invention of the steam engine accelerated the industrial revolution
during the 18th and 19th centuries [2,3,4,5,6].
However, in order to deliver the expected benefits, future autonomous sys-
tems will indeed need to be intelligent - they must integrate seamlessly into
real-world environments, act appropriately in complex physical and temporal
situations, solve difficult logistical problems, interact effectively with human
users/operators using accepted social conventions (such as speech and language),
be robust in the face of unpredictable disturbances and interruptions, operate
independently within an accepted ethical framework, and be at least partially
responsible for their own behaviours [7]. This is a challenging wish list that goes
well beyond the bounds of traditional fields such as Artificial Intelligence (AI).
Indeed, the requirements for intelligent systems/robots are so demanding that
insights need to be integrated from a wide array of disciplines ranging from
engineering and computer science to psychology, cognitive neuroscience and lin-
guistics.
In practice, a robot is a complex physical entity often consisting of a large
number of moving parts, an electrical power system, an array of electronic com-
ponents including on-board and off-board processors, wired and wireless com-
munication links, various computer operating systems and a range of software
modules for managing the overall system. This means that it is not only neces-
sary to develop comprehensive tools and techniques for designing, building and
programming such devices to meet particular application requirements, but it is
very likely that approaches will also need to be based on a deeper understanding
of how existing intelligent systems - living organisms - solve the challenges listed
above [8,9].
At present, the sheer complexity of such systems, coupled with the high cost
of developing bespoke hardware platforms, inevitably means that components
are integrated without a great deal of thought being given to more general prin-
ciples of intelligent behaviour. Off-the-shelf solutions for locomotion, navigation,
manipulation and interaction are often combined with independent modules for
input/output modalities such as vision, speech and gesture without too much
consideration of potential synergies. As a result, behaviours may be programmed
in an ad-hoc manner using heuristic (rather than principled) approaches to the
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necessary algorithms1. What is required is an overarching theory of intelligent
behaviour that informs system-level design decisions in order to provide a more
coherent approach to system integration, especially for communicative agents.
1.1 Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Intelligence
The term Artificial Intelligence (AI) was coined in 1955 and, in its early years,
was mainly concerned with mathematical logic and automatic theorem prov-
ing (on the assumption that ‘intelligence’ was founded on processes of rational
thought) [10]. Activities such as playing chess were seen as the epitome of human
intellectual achievement, and thus became the focus of early research. However,
it was soon realised that physically manipulating actual chess pieces could be
more challenging than playing the game itself. AI thus moved on to fulfil an
important role in expanding our understanding of how living systems in gen-
eral, and human beings in particular, interact physically with the world through
developments in areas such as bio-inspired robotics and autonomous systems.
Until the mid-1980s, the main paradigm for AI-based robotics was the so-
called ‘deliberative’ architecture in which symbolic representations of the world
were manipulated in a hierarchical rule-based framework involving goals and
subgoals. The process operated using a Sense → Plan → Act cycle (see Fig. 1),
very much in tune with the ‘behaviourist’ Stimulus → Response (S-R) framework
that was dominating the field of psychology at the time [11].
Fig. 1. Illustration of the sequential deliberative (Sense → Plan → Act) architecture
popular in Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Intelligence (GOFAI).
When applied to robotics, the deliberative AI paradigm essentially took a
high-level approach in which functions such as navigation were regarded as
problem-solving activities that required the manipulation and search of appro-
priate symbolic data structures. However, it soon became apparent that this
perspective - subsequently termed Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Intelligence
(GOFAI) [12] - suffered from severe limitations, particularly with respect to an
over-reliance on accurate world models and an inability to respond quickly to
changing situations and context.
1 Of course it’s not that such theory doesn’t exist. Rather, the demands of contem-
porary intelligent systems are such that it is often necessary to take a pragmatic
approach to system implementation.
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1.2 Behaviour-Based Robotics
By the 1980s, the mounting difficulties faced by attempting to deploy GOFAI
in real-world robots had led to a new ‘reactive’ (as opposed to ‘deliberative’)
approach based on low-level representation-free processes. Hailing the establish-
ment of what was to be known as ‘New AI’, Rodney Brooks introduced a novel
‘subsumption’ architecture in which the emphasis was on real-time behaviour us-
ing simple computations embedded in a layered structure [13], [14] (see Fig. 2).
The basic idea was that the different layers should operate more or less indepen-
dently (and in parallel), with the higher levels relying on successful operation of
the lower levels. If necessary, the higher levels could change (that is, ‘subsume’)
the behaviour of the lower levels. Overall, the emphasis was on the grounding
of behaviour in the real-world, with the hypothesis that complex interactions
should arise as an emergent property of an array of simple processes (as had
been elegantly proposed by Braitenberg in the 1980s [15]).
The subsumption approach initiated a trend towards what became known as
‘behaviour-based robotics’ [16], and the emphasis shifted from high-level abstract
problem solving to low-level grounded intelligence.
Fig. 2. Illustration of the layered reactive subsumption architecture popular in
behaviour-based robotics.
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Behaviour-based robotics was sufficiently successful in solving practical real-
world problems that, in 1990, Rodney Brooks founded the company iRobot®
to develop and market the Roomba® vacuum cleaning robot. More than 10
million Roomba robots have been sold worldwide, making it the most success-
ful mass-market robot to date. However, the subsumption approach has been
criticised for being difficult to scale up to more complex robots. Also, the em-
phasis on representation-free processing, whilst being popular with a subset of
psychologists, is ultimately a significant restriction2.
1.3 Artificial Cognitive Systems
Recent work in robotics has taken a more pragmatic view by mixing and match-
ing the best ideas from GOFAI and behaviour-based robotics with some of the
new perspectives emerging from the field of cognitive neuroscience. Known as
‘artificial cognitive systems’ [17,18], the most significant influence has been the
emphasis on enaction, embodiment and situatedness in which the relationship
between a goal-driven robot and its physical real-world context is paramount
[19,20]. Low-level interactions are managed locally and high-level representations
are given ‘meaning’, not by hand-crafted rules, but by virtue of their grounding
in real-world interactions. Interaction is facilitated by the ‘affordances’ [21,22]
provided by a robot’s environment.
A particular example of a contemporary architecture for an artificial cognitive
system is Distributed Adaptive Control (DAC) [23,24]. The DAC architecture is
based on the hypothesis that the living brain maintains a stable relationship with
its environment by continuously solving the How, Why, What, Where, When
(H4W) problem. Implementation uses an artificial neural structure organised
into soma, reactive, adaptive and contextual layers, and columns which represent
exosensing (defined as the sensation and perception of the world), endosensing
(detecting and signalling states derived from the physical self) and action (the
interface to the world) - see Fig. 3.
Unlike their GOFAI predecessors, modern cognitive approaches to intelligent
systems (such as DAC) view action and perception as being synergistic (rather
than separate) processes [25], and that skills should be acquired through the
robot’s own active exploration of the world (rather then being pre-programmed
by the system designer) [26,27]. Such approaches very much reflect contemporary
models of living systems, particularly the discovery in the 1990s of so-called
‘mirror neurons’ - neural structures which appear to provide a vital link between
sensory and motor behaviour and thereby a mechanism for action understanding,
imitation and learning [28,29,30].
A recent book by Murray Shanahan provides an excellent overview of the
contemporary perspective in artificial cognitive systems [31].
2 In reality, the proposal that internal models were unnecessary was a stance adopted
by Brooks to make a strong point about the inadequacies of GOFAI. In practice,
the subsumption architecture incorporates such models (for example, the building
of maps is mentioned in Fig. 2).
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Fig. 3. Illustration of the Distributed Adaptive Control (DAC) architecture organised
into exosensing, endosensing and action columns, and soma, reactive, adaptive and
contextual layers (derived from Fig. 1 in [24]).
PCT and Beyond 7
1.4 Agent Based Modelling
One aspect of behaviour that is common across alternative approaches to mod-
elling and building intelligent systems is intentionality. It is clearly the case that
living systems appear to be goal-directed and purposeful in their endeavours [32],
and this has had a major influence on AI and robotics. In particular, one area
in which intentionality plays a key role is the field of Agent-Based Modelling
(ABM) [33,34]. ABM is a well-established methodology for simulating the ac-
tions and interactions of multiple agents: for example, predicting the behaviour
of crowds, optimising a supply chain or managing a workforce. Various modelling
paradigms are employed, such as cellular automata [35] or dedicated multi-agent
programming environments [36]. However, for ‘intelligent’ agents, ABM simula-
tions are often constructed using a Beliefs Desires Intentions (BDI) architecture
[37,38] on the premise that such internal structures are required to adequately
condition the behaviour of individual agents - see Fig. 4.
Fig. 4. Illustration of the Beliefs, Desires and Intentions (BDI) architecture used in
the field of Agent-Based Modelling. ‘Beliefs’ capture the informational state of an
agent, ‘Desires’ represent its motivational state and ‘Intentions’ represent its delibera-
tive state.
BDI is a powerful approach to modelling agents, and it has been applied
successfully to robotics [39,40]. However, BDI does not specify how to recog-
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nise/interpret behaviour under conditions of ambiguity or uncertainty - a crucial
feature of intelligent systems.
1.5 Contemporary Intelligent Systems
Over the past ten years, the field of robotics and autonomous systems has grown
in stature and achievement. Robots such as Boston Dynamics’ Big Dog and
Honda’s Asimo have successfully demonstrated that modern-day computing and
electronics are finally fast enough to permit real-time control of complex be-
haviours such as running or climbing on uneven surfaces. Robotic quadcopters
have been shown flying through moving hoops [41] and playing tennis [42], robot
hands have been programmed to catch thrown objects [43] and NASA’s Robo-
naut R2 has been assisting on the International Space Station since 2011 [44].
Also, recent years have seen tremendous growth in the field of Artificial Neural
Networks (ANNs), particularly with the success of deep learning as a mechanism
to optimise the parameters of such multilayered networks on massive amounts
of training data [45,46].
Nevertheless, despite this tremendous progress, there is still a long way to
go before artificial intelligent systems will be able to demonstrate the flexibility,
robustness and autonomy exhibited by even the simplest living organism [47,48].
Many contemporary robots rely on teleoperation by human operators to over-
come weaknesses in their overall design, and attempts to create humanoid robots
are fraught with difficulties ranging from the risk of repulsing human users due
to the uncanny valley effect [49,50], to the more general uncertainties associated
with human-robot interaction [51,52,53] - especially if it involves communicative
agents and spoken language [54].
For example, probably the most well known communicative agent is Siri, Ap-
ple’s voice-based personal assistant for the iPhone. Released in 2011, Siri sud-
denly brought spoken language technology to the attention of the non-specialist
user. Voice dictation software for document creation on PCs had been avail-
able since the 1990s, culminating with the release of Dragon System’s Naturally
Speaking and IBM’s ViaVoice products in 1997. The big difference was that
Siri combined automatic speech recognition and speech synthesis with natural
language processing and dialogue management in order to facilitate a more con-
versational interaction between users and smart devices, and competitors such
as Google Now and Microsoft’s Cortana soon followed.
In reality, the practical value of contemporary communicative agents is some-
what in doubt (as evidenced by the preponderance of videos on YouTube which
depict humorous rather than practical interactions). This has been confirmed
by a recent survey that discovered only 13% of respondants use their voice-
based personal agent daily, whereas 46% had tried it once and then abandoned
it [55]. One reason for the lack of usability is that contemporary communicative
agents are founded on a classic stimulus→response architecture (as illustrated in
Fig. 5); a user speaks, their utterance is processed, a response is formulated and
the system speaks back. Such an approach completely overlooks the reality of
languaging as an emergent property of the dynamic coupling between intentional
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agents that serves to facilitate distributed sense-making through cooperative be-
haviours [57,58,59,60,61]. Furthermore, the contemporary view is that language
is based on the co-evolution of two key traits: ostensive-inferential communica-
tion and recursive mind-reading [62].
These are very sophisticated notions but, as yet, there is no clear practical
framework for implementing such concepts. As a result, the field is still open
for new ideas, and some of them may not be so new. For example, what might
Perceptual Control Theory (PCT) - established over 50 years ago [63,64] (and the
topic of this volume) - have to contribute to future ‘intelligent’ communicative
systems?
Fig. 5. Illustration of the standard Speech Interface Framework published by the World
Wide Web Consortium (W3C) [56].
2 Whither Perceptual Control Theory?
Although it is more than 40 years since the publication of Bill Powers’ semi-
nal book ‘Behavior: The Control of Perception’ (B:CP) [65], Perceptual Control
Theory may still have something important to say about computational mod-
els of ‘intelligent’ communicative behaviour. Over the years, the main thrust
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of PCT has been to question the traditional behaviourist stimulus→response
stance that still prevails in some sections of the psychology field [66,67]. PCT
aims to provide a more parsimonious model which highlights the critical im-
portance of acknowledging the existence of internal preferred states (so called
‘reference variables’) arranged in a control hierarchy, together with the power of
negative feedback to achieve and maintain those preferred states in the face of
unpredictable disturbances. Crucially, PCT focuses attention on the control of
perceptual inputs rather than behavioural outputs [68].
Of course, negative feedback control is endemic in the field of robotics (partic-
ularly at the lowest levels of motor control), not least because many robotocists
are trained control engineers. However, mainstream control engineering tends
to concentrate on the regulation of required behaviour (low-level outputs) in a
single control loop, and the emphasis is on modelling the dynamics of the sys-
tem under control in order to calibrate the parameters of the control process.
Also, hierarchical control structures are much less common. PCT thus offers a
broader perspective that is often overlooked, as well as introducing the proposal
that living organisms control perceptions rather than behaviours.
2.1 Classic Automatic Control
As a reminder, PCT was developed in the context of existing knowledge of the
classic theory of automatic control - the study of systems that are capable of
self-regulation, usually through the mechanism of negative feedback [69]. A clas-
sic single-input single-output closed loop negative feedback control system from
automatic control theory is illustrated in Fig. 6. The plant (or controlled system)
g2 is the process controlled by the feedback control system, and the behaviour
of the plant may be subject to arbitrary disturbances d. The feedforward (con-
trol) elements g1 generate control signals u that are applied to the plant which
produces the controlled output c. The reference input r specifies the desired
output of the plant. The feedback elements h map the controlled output c to
the feedback signal b, and this is compared to the external reference input r and
the resulting error signal e generates a control action via g1. With appropriate
functions for g1 , g2 and h, the system should compensate for any disturbances
and stabilise with b → r without having to measure d. The process is termed
negative feedback because the comparator involves subtraction.
It can be shown that the input-output relations of the classic control system
shown in Fig. 6 are given (in the frequency domain) by the equation
C =
(
G2G1
1 + HG2G1
)
R, (1)
where G2G11+HG2G1 is the closed-loop transfer function and HG2G1 is the loop gain.
If G2G1  1 and H ≈ 1, then C ≈ R.
Clearly the tracking behaviour of a classic negative-feedback control system
depends on the feedforward (control) elements g1. If the control element is slow
to respond to a disturbance, then stabilisation may take too long; this is referred
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Fig. 6. Illustration of a classic negative feedback control system from automatic control
theory (derived from Fig. 2-6 on page 16 of [69]).
to as an overdamped system. On the other hand, if the loop gain is too high,
then the system may overshoot and even oscillate; this is referred to as an un-
derdamped system. In practice, g1 is often implemented using a Proportional,
Integral, Derivative (PID) controller which takes the following idealised form:
uPID = KP e + KI
∫
e (t) dt + KD
de
dt
, (2)
where the three constants - KP , KI and KD - are used to optimise the stability
of the control process (referred to as a critically damped system). KP is known
as the ‘loop gain’ and it determines the speed of response of the system to error.
If KP is too high, then the system may respond too quickly and overshoot (or
even become unstable); if it is too low, then the system may respond too late
to counteract any disturbance. The effect of KD is to slow the rate of change of
the controller output and thus minimise overshoot arising from a high KP . KI
is intended to reduce any residual steady-state error. There are various methods
for estimating these constants and, in practice, KI and KD can often be set to
zero.
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2.2 Hierarchical Perceptual Control
Contemporary automatic control systems tend to be based on a single control
loop, but the dynamic behaviour of the system to be controlled is often very com-
plex. PCT, on the other hand, decomposes a system into a hierarchical/layered
structure with a multiplicity of control loops at each level; this is referred to as
Hierarchical Perceptual Control Theory (HPCT) [65]. Inspired by classic auto-
matic control theory, the basic perceptual control unit (feedback control loop)
in PCT is illustrated in Fig. 7.
Fig. 7. Illustration of a basic perceptual control unit (derived from Fig. 5.2 on page 61
of [65]).
Note the similarity between Fig. 7 and Fig. 6. The main difference is that
the PCT structure illustrated in Fig. 7 is specifically aimed at modelling the
behaviour of a living system, and this means that the reference variable is in-
trinsic (rather than extrinsic). In all other respects the two control structures
are effectively identical3.
3 Note that PCT practitioners refer to the feedback signal (p in Fig. 7) as the controlled
variable thereby emphasising that it is the perceptual signal that is controlled in a
negative feedback control system, not the plant.
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As mentioned, HPCT derives its power from the hierarchical structure of
multiple control loops in which the output from one loop provides the reference
signal for another loop. Powers [65] proposed specific orders of control (starting
at the lowest first-order level) as follows: intensity ⇔ sensation ⇔ configuration
⇔ transitions ⇔ sequence ⇔ relationships ⇔ program ⇔ principles ⇔ system
concepts.
Powers also generalised the basic perceptual control unit to include the stor-
age and retrieval of information in memory. In particular, he proposed that all
reference signals constitute recordings of past perceptual signals that are re-
trieved by address signals from the higher level - see Fig. 8. Implementation
of this feature required the addition of two switches - a memory switch and
a perceptual switch. Powers noted that each of the four possible combinations
of switch settings lead to interesting outcomes. If both switches are vertical
(a+d), then the loop is in “conventional control mode”. If the perceptual switch
is vertical and the memory switch is non-vertical (a+c), then information can
be acquired without action taking place; Powers called this “passive observation
mode”. If the memory switch is vertical and the perceptual switch is non-vertical
(b+d), then control takes place with no perceptual awareness at higher levels;
Powers referred to this as “automatic mode”. Finally, if both switches are non-
vertical (b+c), then past perceptions (retrieved from memory) are redirected
back up the hierarchy; Powers designated this as “imagination mode”, and iden-
tified it as a potential mechanism for visualisation and planning.
On the surface, the HPCT architecture looks remarkably similar to subsump-
tion (as described in section 1.2). However, a key distinction is that HPCT is
capable of optimising many variables simultaneously within a negative feedback
control framework, whereas subsumption is essentially an event-driven stimu-
lus→response architecture [70].
Finally, Powers identified three types of learning within HPCT: the storage
of information in memory, problem-solving and reorganisation. The latter is par-
ticularly interesting since it involves altering the structure and properties of the
control systems themselves. Powers viewed reorganisation as a kind of meta con-
trol system that had the objective of reducing the intrinsic error of the overall
system to zero.
2.3 The Way Forward?
Perceptual control theory (and HPCT) appears to offer a number of interesting
features for modelling the behaviour of living systems [71], and should thus be a
serious contender for implementing control in artificial systems such as robots (as
envisaged by Powers [72,73,74,75]). A few attempts have been made in this area
by PCT practitioners [76,77,78]. However, since a large proportion of robotocists
are control engineers who take negative feedback systems as a given, they have
not seen the particular benefits of using (H)PCT.
On the other hand, (H)PCT has started to have some influence in the field of
spoken language processing [79]. It was established many years ago that human
speech is optimised by speakers for listeners [80], and this has been theorised
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Fig. 8. Illustration of an HPCT unit showing the perceptual and memory switches
which can be set for control mode (a+d), passive observation mode (a+c), automatic
mode (b+d) or imagination mode (b+c) (derived from Fig. 15.2 on page 221 of [65]).
as resulting from the operation of negative feedback processes [81]. Hence, there
is an obvious link with PCT. However, mainstream speech technology systems
have tended to ignore speaker-listener dependencies and such behaviour is simply
modelled as stochastic variation [82].
In an attempt to capture such dependencies, and inspired by classic auto-
matic control, (H)PCT and recent discoveries in cognitive neuroscience (such as
mirror neurons - discussed in Section 1.3), the PREdictive SENsory Control and
Emulation (PRESENCE) architecture [83] provides some novel technical solu-
tions in this area. For example, a PRESENCE-based text-to-speech synthesiser
- C2H - has been developed that is capable of adjusting its pronunciation while
it is speaking as a function of its perceived communicative success, the latter
being judged using a perceptual feedback path in which the ‘controlled variable’
was an estimate of the intelligibility [84,85].
PRESENCE not only provides a novel architecture for generating spoken
language, it also shows how the principles of feedback control can be applied to
the recognition and interpretation of spoke language [86]. Indeed, PRESENCE
emphasises that in order to manage its own behaviour (its perceptions), a social
agent also needs to be able to interpret the world and the behaviour of other in-
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Fig. 9. Illustration of the PCT-inspired PREdictive SENsorimotor Control and Emula-
tion (PRESENCE) architecture for spoken language processing [79,83]). The diagram
depicts a high-level view of an integrated speaker-listener; the first level is the primary
route for motor behaviour (speaking), the second layer is an emulation of possible motor
actions, the third layer is an emulation of the interlocutor’s emulation of the speaker-
listener and the bottom layer is the interpretation of the interlocutor (listening). All
levels involve control feedback processes, and information is shared between one layer
and another. The architecture is intended to describe a system that can communicate
successfully in the face of disturbances such as noise, distortion and feedback from the
interlocutor.
telligent systems within it. Hence, much greater emphasis is placed on modelling
perception than is the norm in mainstream PCT. PRESENCE thus provides
an interesting insight into a potentially more general-purpose PCT-inspired ar-
chitecture that is not specific to spoken language processing and which could
be applied in engineered solutions. However, the founding principles of such an
architecture have not been fully elucidated, so what follows is a step in that
direction.
3 Towards ‘Intelligent’ Communicative Systems
The insightful catchphrase for (H)PCT is “Behaviour is the control of percep-
tion” - but what is perception, and how are controlled variables estimated? In
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B:CP [65], Powers himself does not say a great deal about perceptual mecha-
nisms; he acknowledges the potentially arbitrary relationship that exists between
internal perceptions and external reality, but he seems to assume some form of
straightforward (neural) transformation/mapping from first-order intensities to
invariant higher-order perceptions that is carried out by an ‘input function’
(albeit mediated by memory - see Section 2.2). Of course such an assumption
is common in the pattern recognition/machine learning literature. However, in
practical fields such as visual or auditory scene analysis (and even in the latest
theories of brain function [87]), the notion of ‘perception as transformation’ has
been complemented by the emergence of more powerful (and more successful)
generative model-based solutions [88,89,90]. Hence, there is a potentially valuable
opportunity to map these findings back into (H)PCT.
Not only is this an interesting route to take, but it also turns out to be a
crucial step towards a deeper understanding of how one intelligent system (such
as an autonomous social robot) might interact/communicate with another (such
as a human being) [91]. What follows, therefore, is a fundamental analysis -
starting from first principles - that intersects with (H)PCT and then extends it
in important and interesting ways.
3.1 Actions and Consequences
Consider a world that obeys the ordinary Laws of Physics. The world W has a
set of possible states S, and its state s[t] at time t is some function of its state
s[t−1] at time t−1. The world can thus be viewed as a form of dynamical system
(probably non-linear, almost certainly stochastic) that evolves from state to state
as time progresses. These state transitions can be expressed as a transform . . .
fW : s[t− 1]→ s[t], (3)
where fW is some function that transforms the state of the world at time t− 1
to the state of the world at time t.
This means that the evolution of events in the world constitutes a continuous
cycle of cause-and-effect. Events follows a time course in which it can be said
that actions (i.e. the sequence of events in the past) lead to consequences (i.e.
the sequence of events in the future) which constitute further actions, leading to
further consequences, and so on . . .
Consequences = fW (Actions) . (4)
This straightforward scenario (as described by equations 3 and 4) can be
expressed diagrammatically as shown in Fig. 10.
Of course, while the transform fW might be relatively simple (since it is based
on the Laws of Physics), the state-space S of possible actions and consequences
could be immense depending on the complexity of the world W . This means
that it is impossible to model everything that happens in the world. However,
in practice, some parts of the world might have very little influence on other
parts. So it is possible to consider a subset of the world w that has a minimal
dependency on the rest of the world w¯.
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Fig. 10. Illustration of the continuous cycle of cause-and-effect in a world that obeys
the ordinary Laws of Physics.
3.2 An Agent Manipulating the World
Now consider the presence of an intentional agent a (natural or artificial) that
seeks to effect a change in the world4. In this case the agent’s intentions are
converted into actions which are, in turn, transformed into consequences . . .
Consequences = fw (ga(Intentions)) , (5)
where g is some function that transforms the agent’s intentions into actions (a
process known in robotics as ‘action selection’ ) - see Fig. 11.
Fig. 11. Illustration of an intentional agent manipulating the world in an open-loop
S-R configuration.
The situation illustrated in Fig. 11 corresponds to an open-loop S-R con-
figuration, and this means that the accuracy with which an agent can achieve
its intended consequences is critically dependent on having precise information
about both f and g. Mathematically, the best method for achieving the required
consequences is for the agent to employ an inverse transform in which g is re-
placed by f−1 - see Fig. 125.
4 The reason why the agent wishes to change the state of the world is addressed later
(in Section 3.7).
5 Note that, in the situation where f represents the plant operating a robot’s actuators,
the estimation of f−1 is commonly referred to as ‘inverse kinematics’ .
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Fig. 12. Illustration of an intentional agent manipulating the world in an open-loop
S-R configuration using an inverse model.
It is possible to discuss at length how information about the transforms g,
f or f−1 could be acquired. For example, model parameters could be computed
using complex mathematical tools for system estimation or by employing ma-
chine learning techniques on extensive quantities of training data using a process
known as ‘expectation maximisation’ (EM) [92]. Whichever approach is taken,
the final outcome would inevitably be sensitive to any inaccuracies in calibrat-
ing the relevant model parameters as well as being unable to tolerate unforeseen
noise and/or disturbances present in the agent or in the world.
Control theory, and thereby PCT, of course provides an alternative closed-
loop solution that is not dependent on knowing f (or f−1). An agent simply
needs to be able to judge whether its objectives are being met - that is, whether
the consequences of its actions match its intentions. An agent thus needs to be
able to choose actions that minimise the difference between its intentions and
the perceived consequences of its actions - see Fig. 13. In PCT terminology, the
agent’s intentions correspond to the reference signal and the perceived conse-
quences correspond to the controlled variable; actions are selected in order to
minimise the difference between the two.
Fig. 13. Illustration of an intentional agent manipulating the world in a closed-loop
PCT-style negative-feedback configuration. In this configuration the transform g cor-
responds to the ‘output function’ (in PCT) or ‘controller’ (in classic control theory),
and the transform h corresponds to the ‘input function’ (in PCT) or ‘feedback element’
(in classic control theory).
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If the perceptual signal, and hence the error signal, is in the same parameter
space as the control signal (see Fig. 6), then it is possible - in principle - to
jump to the optimum solution in one step. However, in practice it takes time to
correct an error (since physical actions cannot take place instantaneously). So
the process typically iterates towards a solution (by information flowing around
the loop). If, on the other hand, the perceptual signal and the control signal
are not in the same parameter space, then there is no direct mapping between
error and control action (unless such a mapping has been learnt in advance). So,
again, an iterative procedure is required6.
This means that, although closed-loop control does not require information
about f (or f−1), it does need to know about g - the relationship between the
error gradient in perceptual space and the appropriate control action. Even a
simple thermostat needs to be configured correctly such that a decrease in the
temperature of a room leads to an increase in the level of heating (and vice
versa); in this case, the uni-dimensional perceptual error gradient determines
the polarity of the action of the controller. In general, perceptions and actions
may lie in (different) high-dimensional spaces7 and, either the relationship be-
tween possible behaviours and the perceptual error gradient is (somehow) known
in advance, or it has to be discovered (learnt) by active exploration; for example,
using ‘reinforcement learning’ [93] or the process referred to in PCT as ‘reorgan-
isation’ - see Section 2.2.
A further complication is that the error space may not be continuous. In this
case there is no gradient and hence no indication of which action to select in
order to arrive at the correct solution. For example, imagine a person who wishes
to illuminate one section of a large room being faced with a set of unmarked
light switches laid out in no obvious arrangement. The only available strategy is
to try each switch in a random fashion until the appropriate light illuminates8.
Of course, once a mapping - g - has been discovered, it may be stored in memory
and used to guide future behaviour.
In many situations, negative feedback control is able to employ an optimi-
sation technique known as gradient descent in which the difference between the
intentions (the reference signal) and the perceived consequences (the feedback
signal) is a continuous variable that can be reduced monotonically to zero. In this
case, the dynamics of the optimisation is dependent on the appropriate choice
of parameters in the controller (for example, KP , KI and KD in a classic PID
controller - as described in Section 2.1); an inappropriate choice of controller
6 For example, a thermostat measures temperature, whereas the control signal for a
heating/cooling system would be expressed in terms of power output. This means
that a-priori there is no information on how to convert a difference between desired
and actual temperature (the error signal) to an optimum power setting (the control
signal). Hence the power output has to be adjusted iteratively until the desired
temperature is reached.
7 In robotics, the space of possible actions is characterised by the Degrees-of-Freedom
(DoF) in the system, and this usually corresponds to the number of joints or actu-
ators/motors.
8 This is a common experience for an academic teaching in an unfamiliar lecture room.
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parameters (such as the wrong sign for KP ) can even send the system in the op-
posite direction (that is, positive feedback) with a consequent failure to converge.
In classic control systems, the process of optimising control parameters is often
performed manually. In PCT, it is performed by reorganisation (see Section 2.2)
which is, itself, a negative feedback control process (and which is interestingly
similar to the ‘actor-critic’ approach to reinforcement learning [94]).
This discussion makes it clear that, in general, negative feedback control
may be viewed as an iterative search9 process and, in the example of the
discrete light switches with no prior information, only a random (as opposed to
directed) search is feasible. The realisation that control can be regarded as a type
of search is a key result, and it emphasises that the topology of the search space
and the controller’s information about that topology is key to the effectiveness
and outcome of the optimisation.
Returning to the agent a attempting to manipulate the world w, negative
feedback control can thus be viewed as a search over possible actions to find those
which give rise to the best match between intentions and perceived consequences.
This can be expressed as
Âctions = arg min
Actions
(Intentions− Perceived Consequences) , (6)
where Âctions represents an estimate of the actions required to minimise the
difference between intentions and perceived consequences - see Fig. 14.
Fig. 14. Illustration of an intentional agent manipulating the world in a closed-loop
configuration using a search process to select actions that minimise the difference be-
tween its intentions and the perceived consequences.
The structure illustrated in Fig. 14 is similar to the classic PCT arrangement,
but enhanced by the identification of iterative search as the basis of a negative-
feedback controlled optimisation process. However, this configuration will only
function correctly if (i) the agent can observe the consequences of its actions
9 Note that ‘search’ is a term used by computer scientists to describe a process that
engineers would refer to as ‘optimisation’. In both cases, a system iterates/converges
towards an optimum solution by minimising/maximising some ‘objective function’ -
in this case, minimising an error signal. The value of using the term ‘search’ is that
it covers both continuous and discrete forms of optimisation.
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and (ii) the search space is concave10. If the consequences of an agent’s actions
are hidden from observation in space (because objects are obscured11) or in time
(because feedback delays are too high or the intended consequences are in the
future), the loop can still function, but only if the agent is able to estimate the
consequences of possible actions. Likewise, if the search space is not concave but
has many local minima, then an iterative search can avoid getting stuck in the
nearest one by exploring the whole space in advance. In other words, in both of
these cases, an agent could gain benefit by being able to predict the consequences
of possible actions.
In other words, if an agent cannot directly observe the consequences of its
actions, or the search space has many local optima, then it needs to (i) estimate
the relationship between possible actions and possible consequences (fw), (ii)
perform a search over hypothetical actions and then (iii) execute those actions
that are found to minimise the estimated error. In this case . . .
Âctions = arg min
A˜ctions
(
Intentions− f̂w(A˜ctions)
)
, (7)
where f̂w is the estimate of fw and A˜ctions is the set of possible actions - see
Fig. 15.
Fig. 15. Illustration of an intentional agent manipulating the world in a closed-loop
PCT-style configuration in the situation where it is unable to directly observe the
consequences of its actions (in space or time).
What is interesting in this arrangement is that the estimated transform f̂w
can be interpreted as a form of mental simulation (or predictor) which emulates
the consequences of possible actions prior to action selection [95]. In other words,
searching over f̂w(A˜ctions) is equivalent to planning (and corresponds to Powers’
imagination mode in HPCT, i.e. the b+c setting in Fig. 8). It also shows that
the ability to perform “what if” simulations is not a property of a particular
10 That is, the search space has only one global optimum.
11 For example, attempting to achieve some objective in the dark, reaching behind
another object or, of particular significance here, manipulating the internal states of
another agent (as will be discussed in Section 3.4).
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level of control, but is a generic property that can be instantiated in any control
loop at any level (as proposed by Powers).
The ability to emulate the consequences of possible actions is important
because, not only is it a link between PCT and AI planning, but it also offers the
possibility of finding global (rather than local) solutions12. From an ecological
perspective, this could be critical in terms of saving living systems vital time
and/or energy in real world situations.
3.3 An Agent Interpreting the World
Having established an extended PCT-style framework for an agent attempting
to manipulate the physical world (with search as the underlying mechanism
supporting negative feedback control), it is now possible to turn to the comple-
mentary situation in which an agent a is attempting to interpret the world w.
In this case, interpretation is defined as an agent deriving potentially hidden
actions/causes of events by observing their visible effects/consequences13.
Âctions = ha (fw(Actions)) , (8)
where h is some perceptual function that transforms observed effects into esti-
mated causes - see Fig. 16.
Fig. 16. Illustration of an agent a attempting to infer the hidden causes/actions from
their observable effects/consequences.
Given that consequences are caused by actions via the transform fw, it is
possible (in principle) to compute the actions directly from the observed conse-
quences using the inverse transform f−1w - see Fig. 17.
Of course, the accuracy of this process depends on the fidelity of the inverse
transform. In practice, f−1w is not known and very hard to estimate. A more
12 As an example, the fastest route between two points on a map may not be the short-
est, nor does each move forward necessarily take you nearer to the final destination.
This is the difference between local and global optimisation.
13 For example, given an observation of an object suddenly accelerating along a flat
surface, it is possible to infer (using the laws of physics) that a hidden force must
have acted upon that object.
PCT and Beyond 23
Fig. 17. Illustration of an agent a attempting to infer the hidden causes/actions from
their observable effects/consequences by means of the inverse transform f−1w .
tractable solution is thus not to use an inverse model, but to construct a so-
called ‘forward model’14 (that is, an estimate of fw) and to compare its output
with the observed signals. Mathematically, this is the optimum way to estimate
hidden variables15 given uncertainty in both the observations and the underlying
process. Such a configuration is known as a ‘maximum likelihood (or Bayesian)
classifier’. Also, it is a standard result in the field of statistical estimation that
the parameters of forward/generative models are typically much easier to derive
using reliable techniques for maximum likelihood (ML) or maximum a-posteriori
(MAP) estimation, and performance degrades gracefully when there is missing
data.
The process of interpretation using such an arrangement thus proceeds by
searching over possible actions/causes to find the best match between the pre-
dicted and the observed consequences . . .
Âctions = arg min
Actions
(
Consequences− f̂w(Actions)
)
. (9)
This process is illustrated in Fig. 18, and what is immediately apparent is
that, just as the manipulation case, the process of interpretation may also
be construed as a negative-feedback control loop (in this case, a ‘search’
over possible explanations). This is a significant outcome that is not explicit in
(H)PCT; hence it provides a potentially valuable link between PCT and main-
stream approaches to machine perception.
In fact, the architecture illustrated in Fig. 18 is a familiar16 model-based
recognition framework in which the recognition/interpretation/inference of the
(hidden) cause of observed behaviour is viewed as a search over possible outputs
from a forward model that is capable of generating that behaviour [96,97]. This is
an established and powerful approach in machine perception and scene analysis
14 Also known as a ‘generative model’ .
15 A ‘hidden variable’ is a measurement which cannot be made directly (e.g. by obser-
vation).
16 . . . in the field of machine learning.
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Fig. 18. Illustration of an agent a attempting to infer the hidden causes/actions from
their observable effects/consequences by using a negative-feedback control loop to
search the outputs from f̂w (a forward estimate of fw).
(known as analysis-by-synthesis17), and it has been applied very successfully in
a range of practical scenarios [98,88,99].
3.4 An Agent Communicating its Intentions to Another Agent
The foregoing establishes a remarkably symmetric framework for manipulating
and interpreting the world in the presence of uncertainty and unknown distur-
bances; both employ PCT-style negative-feedback control loops that perform
a search over the potential outputs of forward models. This section (and the
next) extends the arguments to the case where the world contains more than
one agent: a world in which a sending agent s is attempting to change the mental
state of a receiving agent r (that is, communicating its intentions without being
able to directly observe whether those intentions have been perceived18) and the
receiving agent is attempting to interpret the sending agent (that is, estimating
the sending agent’s intentions based only on observations of its actions).
So, again starting from first principles - for the sending agent s
Actionss = gs (Intentionss) , (10)
where gs is the transform from intentions to behaviour, and for the receiving
agent r
Interpretationsr = hr (Actionss) , (11)
where hr is the transform from observed behaviour to interpretations - see
Fig. 19.
Hence, for agent s attempting to communicate its intentions to agent r, the
arguments put forward in Section 3.2 suggest that, if there is no direct feedback
17 The term ‘analysis-by-synthesis’ refers to an established process in the field of signal
processing in which the value of an unknown variable is estimated from observation
data (‘analysis’) using a model of how the observations might have been generated
(‘synthesis’).
18 It might seem perverse to rule out feedback. However, the aim here is to consider
the general case, where feedback may be present or absent.
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Fig. 19. Illustration of a world containing two communicating agents - a sender s and
a receiver r.
from agent r, then agent s needs to compute appropriate behaviour (actions)
based on
̂Actionss = arg min
˜Actionss
(
Intentionss − ĥr( ˜Actionss)
)
, (12)
which is a negative-feedback control loop performing a search over possible be-
haviours by agent s and their interpretations by agent r as estimated by agent
s - see Fig. 20. This process can be viewed as synthesis-by-analysis.
Fig. 20. Illustration of a sending agent optimising its communicative behaviour by
inferring the interpretations made by the receiving agent using a process of synthesis-
by-analysis.
3.5 An Agent Interpreting the Behaviour of Another Agent
For agent r attempting to interpret the intentions of agent s, the arguments
put forward in Section 3.3 suggest that agent r needs to compare the observed
actions of agent s with the output of a forward model for agent s
̂Intentionss = arg min
Intentionss
(Actionss − ĝs(Intentionss)) . (13)
which is a negative-feedback control loop performing a search over the possible
intentions of agent s and their realisations by agent s as estimated by agent r -
see Fig. 21. As in Fig. 18, this process can be viewed as analysis-by-synthesis.
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Fig. 21. Illustration of a receiving agent inferring the communicative intentions of a
sending agent using a process of analysis-by-synthesis.
Interestingly, this configuration is exactly how contemporary approaches to
automatic speech recognition are formulated (using a probabilistic forward gen-
erative model known as a ‘Hidden Markov Model’ - HMM) [90]). In fact, the
analysis-by-synthesis approach to speech recognition is not only reminiscent of
the Motor Theory of speech perception [100], but is also supported by recent
neuroimaging data [101,102]. Hence, there is ample evidence that such a config-
uration is appropriate for modelling perceptual inference.
3.6 Using Self to Model Other
Looking at the arrangements outlined in Sections 3.4 and 3.5, we arrive at an
important result; both require one agent to have a model of (some aspect of)
the other. The sending agent s selects its actions by searching over possible
interpretations by the receiving agent r using an estimate of the receiving agent’s
transform from observations to interpretation (ĥr). The receiving agent r infers
the intentions of the sending agent s by searching over possible interpretations
using as estimate of the sending agent’s transform from intentions to actions
(ĝs) - see Fig. 22.
Fig. 22. Illustration of a world containing one agent (a sender s) communicating with
another (a receiver r) where each makes use of a model of the other. The sender infers
the interpretation of its intentions by the receiver using synthesis-by-analysis, and the
receiver infers the intentions of the sender using analysis-by-synthesis.
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The configuration shown in Fig. 22 leads to an interesting question: where
do the transforms ĥr and ĝs come from? More precisely, how might their param-
eters be estimated? Obviously they could be derived using a variety of different
learning procedures (including PCT-style reorganisation). However, one intrigu-
ing possibility is that, because of the similarity between agents19, each agent
could approximate these functions using information recruited from
their own structures20. In other words, ĥr ← [ hs (which can be searched using
gs rather than ĝr) and ĝs ←[ gr (which can be searched using hr rather than ĥs)
- see Fig. 23.
Fig. 23. Illustration of sending and receiving agents exploiting knowledge of themselves
in order to communicate.
This arrangement, in which both agents exploit sensorimotor knowledge of
themselves to model each other, can be thought of as synthesis-by-analysis-by-
synthesis for the sending agent and analysis-by-synthesis-by-analysis for the re-
ceiving agent. Combining both into a single communicative agent gives rise to
a structure where perception and production are construed as parallel recur-
sive control feedback processes (both of which employ search as the underlying
mechanism for optimisation), and in which the intentions of self and the inten-
tions of other are linked to the behaviour of self and the observations of other,
respectively - see Fig. 24.
3.7 A Needs-Driven Communicative Agent
The preceding arguments have provided interesting answers to two key ques-
tions: (i) how can an agent optimise its behaviour in order to to communicate
19 This situation is particularly relevant to the high degree of similarity that is found
in living systems between conspecifics (members of the same species).
20 The idea of recruiting information about self in order to model other is a core
component of the PRESENCE architecture (Section 2.3) which, in turn, is founded
on the principle of mirror structures in the brain (Section 1.3).
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Fig. 24. Illustration of a communicative agent that is capable of optimising the sig-
nalling of its own intentions (PRODUCTION) and inferring the intentions of others
(PERCEPTION).
its intentions and (ii) how can an agent infer the intentions of another agent by
observing their behaviour? However, thus far it has been assumed that intention-
ality is a key driver of communicative interaction. Hence, an obvious question
is - where do the intentions come from? Of course, HPCT provides a clear an-
swer; the reference signals at one level in a hierarchy are set by the level above
and mediated by memory (as illustrated in Fig. 8). So this would suggest that
intentions should be the output from some higher level.
In B:CP [65], Powers doesn’t use the term ‘intention’ as such, rather he talks
about purposeful behaviour (at all levels of the HPCT hierarchy). However, by
invoking intentionality as a manifestation of purposeful goal-driven behaviour,
it is possible to make a direct link between HPCT and contemporary archi-
tectures such as DAC (Section 1.3) and BDI (Section 1.4)21. In particular, the
BDI approach to agent-based modelling makes it clear that intentionality is not
only derived from an agent’s longer-term goals and desires, but that it is also
21 The main difference between HPCT and these architectures (including the one devel-
oped here) is that HPCT provides a rich decomposition of purposeful behaviour into
the necessary levels of detailed control, whereas the other schemes tend to collapse
such levels into a single abstraction.
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conditioned by the beliefs that an agent holds. More directly, the DAC architec-
ture emphasises that behaviours are ultimately driven by a motivational system
based on an agent’s fundamental needs (such as energy for survival). This ap-
pears to be similar to the important role that intrinsic control systems play in
the development of the perceptual hierarchy in HPCT [65].
Putting all this together, it is possible to formulate a generic (and remarkably
symmetric) architecture for a needs-driven communicative agent that is both a
sender and a receiver22 - see Fig. 25. In this framework it is proposed that a
communicative agent’s behaviour is conditioned on appropriate motivational and
deliberative states (reference signals): Needs → Desires → Intentions. Likewise,
the intentions, desires and needs of another agent are inferred via a parallel
interpretive structure: Perception → Interpretation → Comprehension23.
4 Discussion
The foregoing section has established a putative framework for a needs-driven
communicative agent in which the data structures for needs, desires and inten-
tions represent the informational belief states (controlled variables) of the agent.
As such, these representational structures are analogous to the memory layers in
HPCT (as shown in Fig. 8). However, a key feature of the configuration proposed
here (for a communicative agent) is that these structures explicitly contain in-
formation relating to both self and other, and this allows the behaviour of self
to be conditioned on the inferred informational state of other. In other words, it
provides a basis for modelling interpersonal stances such as empathy [104] and
Theory of Mind (ToM) [105]24.
Another interesting aspect of the architecture illustrated in Fig. 25 is that,
like DAC and PRESENCE, it is founded on a motivational system based on
needs (for example, as described by Maslow in his famous ‘Hierarchy of Needs’
[107]). This might seem to be an unnecessary embellishment - a feature that is
more relevant to modelling a living system than to designing an artificial agent.
However, invoking such a needs-based framework answers a fundamental ques-
tion - why would an agent (natural or artificial) do anything [108]? Also, it
is envisaged that it would be useful to partition needs into those that pertain
to physical health (such as survival and safety needs) and those that pertain
to psychological health (such as personal and social needs), with the relevant
feedback signals being related to physiological and mental well-being. This not
22 A forerunner of this framework has been referred to as MBDIAC (Mutual Beliefs
Desires Intentions Actions & Consequences) [103].
23 From a PCT perspective, these are all perceptions.
24 Interestingly, Marken - a long-standing PCT practitioner - has recently posited the
value of PCT in testing the validity of the inferences that observers make about
the intentional states of others [106]. This might be usefully carried over into the
proposed framework as a strategy an agent might employ in order to establish a
desired cooperative/competitive relationship with another agent.
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only ties in closely with Powers’ observations concerning the importance of op-
timising intrinsic variables that are related to the health of the organism, but it
also links with his view that the control of such variables provides the basis for
reorganisation (i.e. structural learning) [65].
In practice, the motivational framework can be decomposed into two ele-
ments: (i) a needs structure that provides the incentives for behaviour and (ii)
the amount of effort that will be devoted to meeting those needs. The previous
paragraph (and the architecture shown in Fig. 25) addresses the first of these.
The second relates to the enthusiasm of an agent, i.e. how much it cares about
meeting its needs. In a conventional PCT-style negative-feedback control loop,
such behaviour would correspond to the loop gain; a high loop gain implying a
high degree of physical effort/enthusiasm and vice versa. In the framework out-
lined here, such behaviour would relate to the depth and quality of the search(es)
that pervade the overall structure - deep search(es) implying a high degree of
mental effort/enthusiasm and vice versa.
Interestingly, the proposed framework also provides a practical architecture
that supports appraisal theories of emotion [109,110] based on the classic dimen-
sions of pleasure and arousal [111]. For example, the comparators that pervade
the structure each constitute mini-appraisal units that generate measures of pos-
itive/negative affect - the error signals [112]. Likewise, the effort that an agent
devotes to achieving its goals and intentions (as discussed in the previous para-
graph) can be be interpreted as a measure of arousal. Tying this in with Powers’
notion of intrinsic variables driving reorganisation, these emergent properties of
the proposed framework can be interpreted as (i) emotion driving behaviour and
(ii) the perception of emotion driving learning25.
Finally, the core components in the proposed framework have been portrayed
in Fig. 25 as a three-layered control structure. However, this is just a necessary
simplification in order to establish the basic principles. Also, the emphasis has
been on a communicative agent that seeks to influence the internal states of
another agent (as opposed to an agent that seeks to manipulate the physical
behaviour of another agent). In practice, the structures outlined here would be
decomposed into a richer hierarchy of parallel control loops - much as envisaged
in HPCT. The main difference would be that the perceptual apparatus in the
proposed framework would be more structured than in HPCT, with explicit pa-
rameter sharing between behavioural and perceptual components (rather than
the switching arrangement illustrated in Fig. 8). Also, whilst Powers’ mechanism
for reorganisation should be capable of optimising the structure of a decomposed
architecture for any given problem, in practice no-one has yet succeeded in devel-
oping a practical solution. Since some of the solutions presented here are related
to more contemporary approaches to machine learning, it is envisaged that they
might offer a way forward in understanding how to configure an HPCT structure
automatically.
25 This overlaps nicely with Powers’ description of the role of emotion [65].
32 R. K. Moore: PCT and Beyond
5 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter has shown how a practical framework for modelling and imple-
menting ‘intelligent’ systems can be developed from the establishment of a set of
fundamental principles which both intersects with and extends Perceptual Con-
trol Theory. It has been argued that PCT has hitherto placed less emphasis on
the transformation of perceptual functions through mental simulation, and has
treated the mapping from sensation to perception as a relatively straightforward
series of transformations (albeit mediated by memory), thereby overlooking the
potential of powerful generative model-based solutions that have emerged in
practical fields such as visual or auditory scene analysis. Starting from first prin-
ciples, and considering how an intelligent agent might interact with the world
and with other agents it might contain, it has not only been shown how these
ideas might be integrated into PCT, but also how PCT might be extended to-
wards a remarkably symmetric architecture for a needs-driven communicative
agent.
The arguments presented in Section 3 first led to the realisation that the opti-
misation which takes place within a negative feedback control loop is equivalent
to a search process, and this led to a reformulation of intentional behaviour as a
search over possible actions in order to find those which minimise the difference
between an agent’s intentions and the perceived consequences. These principles
were then extended to cover the situation in which the consequences of actions
might be hidden from direct observation (for example, when one agent is ma-
nipulating the mental state of another agent), and this led to the emergence of
simulation as a key mechanism for maintaining a control loop structure by us-
ing an estimate/prediction of possible action consequences. It was then revealed
how searching a simulation facilitates off-line planning which has the important
benefit of being able to compute global (rather than local) solutions.
These principles were then extended to an agent attempting to interpret be-
haviour, and it was shown how the perceptual process itself can be configured
using a familiar PCT-style negative feedback control loop (also involving simula-
tion) which turns out to be equivalent to established techniques for model-based
recognition. It was then shown how the arguments could be extended to cover
agent-to-agent communication, and this led to the crucial realisation that the pa-
rameters of the models used by one agent for simulating another agent could be
derived from the models used to manage their own behaviour - that is, using self
to model other. This novel arrangement was then embedded within a BDI (be-
liefs, desires, intentions) structure to create a new framework for a needs-based
communicative agent.
One of the encouraging outcomes of this analysis is that the new perspective
not only relies on a central role being played by PCT-style negative-feedback con-
trol in action selection and interpretation, but it also links with recent discoveries
in cognitive neuroscience (such as the sensorimotor overlap attributed to mirror
neurons) and aligns in interesting ways with neurally-inspired architectures such
as DAC (Section 1.3). Also, since it has been shown that negative feedback con-
trol (as an optimisation process) may be viewed as a type of search, this opens
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up a potentially important link with a range of model-based techniques that
are already established in some areas of contemporary AI and Cognitive Sys-
tems (particularly in the field of spoken language processing). This means that
the development of the approach can benefit from progress being made in these
other fields, as well as extending the scope and influence of PCT to provide a
more parsimonious computational framework for ‘intelligent’ systems (whether
natural or artificial).
Based on the framework established thus far, the critical next steps are to
formulate practical mechanisms for learning local/global structures and to inves-
tigate the implications of simulations of self and other using small scale agents
(such as robots) in tasks which involve real-world interaction and communication
with other agents. It is too soon to extend the principles to complex scenarios
(such as full blown language-based interaction). Rather, it is necessary to scale-
up the complexity in a careful and controlled manner in order to maintain a
firm scientific and mathematical foundation for the entire enterprise. Such work
is already underway, and early results are encouraging.
Finally, the arguments presented herein lead to the following overall conclu-
sion with respect to modelling intelligent communicative agents - if behaviour is
the control of perception (the central tenet of Perceptual Control Theory), then
perception (at least for communicative agents) can be said to be the simulation
of behaviour.
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